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non-liability.23 Second, the municipal tort-feasor is better able to bear
24
the loss than the innocent victim.
The majority in Hack carefully avoided basing Ohio's position on
public policy and instead chose the weaker argument of sovereign immunity. It would be presumptuous to assume that the court was inviting
argument on municipal immunity. It is doubtful, however, that a basic
change will be made so long as the court is ruling in a case where it is
able to declare a particular municipal function proprietary. Thus, it becomes evident that a fact situation presenting a definite governmental
function, properly argued, will be necessary to bring about a change.
The Avellone25 case expresses the current Ohio trend of expanding
liability. Eight states have already abandoned municipal immunity. In
this light, perhaps Hack marks the beginning in the almost certain battle
ahead to permit recovery in suits against municipalities. Archaic and
illogical legalisms should not mark Ohio as a state that rewards the negligent with impunity and denies recovery to the innocent.2 "
HARRY

T. QUICK

WORKMEN'S COMIPENSATION - THIRD PARTY SUITS EMPLOYER INDEMNIFICATION

Fischer Constr. Co. v. Stroud, 175 Ohio St.
31, 141 N.E.2d 164 (1963).
While plaintiff construction company's employee was flagging down
traffic on a highway where plaintiff was working, a vehicle negligently
driven by defendant's agent fatally struck the employee.' Allowance of
the claim for the employee's death by the State Industrial Commission
resulted in a change of plaintiff's merit rating as an employer.2 Accordingly, plaintiff's rate of premiums paid into the State Insurance Fund was
increased in compliance with Ohio's merit rating system. In an action
against the negligent third party, plaintiff sued for reimbursement of the
increased premiums.
The court of appeals affirmed an order of the trial court which sustained defendant's demurrer because the petition failed to state a cause of
action. Granting a motion to certify, the Ohio Supreme Court affirmed
the court of appeals, holding that:
23. Hack v. City of Salem, 174 Ohio St. 383, 394, 189 N.E.2d 857, 864 (1963). For a
collection of acts which constitute proprietary functions and acts constituting governmental
functions, see the chart compiled by Judge Gibson, 174 Ohio St. 383, 400-02, 189 N.E.2d
857, 866-67 (1963).
24. Id. at 397, 189 N.E.2d at 868.
25. 165 Ohio St. 467, 135 N.E.2d 410 (1956).
26. It must be noted that Judge Gibson limits his view to municipal corporations. See his
syllabus in Hack v. City of Salem, 174 Ohio St. 383, 399, 189 N.E.2d 857, 869 (1963).
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Employer Indemnification

[A]n employer cannot recover from any source any sum to reimburse
him for an increased amount paid as a premium under the Workmen's
Compensation Act due to the death of an employee, although such death
was caused by the act of a third party. 4

The question of whether an employer can recover increased premium
payments5 from a third party who causes the increase is not one of first
impression in Ohio. In Truscon Steel Co. v. Trumbull Cliffs Furnace
Co.,' plaintiff, a self-insurer, compensated its employee for injuries received as a result of the third-party defendant's independent negligence.
In denying recovery, the court stated:
An employee, whether self-insured or otherwise, cannot recover from
any source any sum to reimburse an amount paid under the Workmen's
Compensation Law to injured employees, whether the injury results from
the negligence of some third party, or otherwise.5

The court also relied on the provision of the Ohio Workmen's Compensation Act which declares indemnity contracts void.9 Although the
Truscon case did not involve the specific issue of an employer's loss
through increased premium payments, a literal interpretation of its broad
1. Fischer Constr. Co. v. Stroud, 175 Ohio St. 31, 191 N.E.2d 164 (1963).
2. Plaintiff alleged such change would increase premiums $27,515 over a five year period.
Such increased premiums can be "positively" determined by an actuary as was done in Midvale
Coal Co. v. Cardox Corp., 152 Ohio St. 437, 89 N.E.2d 673 (1949), aff'd on rehearing, 157
Ohio St.526, 106 N.E.2d 556 (1952).
3. OHIo REv. CODE § 4123.34. This section requires the Industrial Commission to classify
occupations according to risk and establish a rating based on the classification. In addition,
each employer within a. classification is given a merit rating based on his individual accident
record. The individual employer's premium will vary according to his merit rating which
may be above the average for the particular occupation. This provision was passed pursuant
to OHIo CONST. art. II, § 55, and upheld in State ex rel. Zone Cab Corp. v. Industrial
Comm'n, 132 Ohio St. 156, 5 N.E.2d 477 (1936).
Section 4123.35 of the Ohio Revised Code requires each employer to pay into the State
Insurance Fund the amount of premiums fixed by the Commission for that employer's occupation together with any increased premium.
4. Fischer Constr. Co. v. Stroud, 175 Ohio St. 31, 34, 191 N.E.2d 164, 166 (1963). (Emphasis added.)
5. Subrogation was not involved in the instant case because the injured employee had not
been paid by the employer. Rather, plaintiff sought to recover damages to itself caused by
defendant's negligence. Even in a subrogation action, an Ohio employer may not recover
from a third party because Ohio has no subrogation provision. It generally is recognized that
an employer may not recover without such a provision. 3 SCHNIDER, WORKMEN'S COMPBNSATION TExT 179 (3d ed. 1943).
6. 120 Ohio St. 394, 166 N.E. 368 (1929); accord, Cleveland, Columbus & Cincinnati
Highway, Inc. v. Bookmyer, 67 Ohio App. 476, 37 N.E.2d 393 (1941).
7. The negligence did not result in a breach of contract or implied warranty between the
third party and the employer.
8. Truscon Steel Co. v. Trumbull Cliffs Furnace Co., 120 Ohio St. 394, 166 N.E. 368
(1929). (Emphasis added.)
9. OHwo REv. CODE § 4123.82 (formerly OHIo GEN. CODE of 1910 § 1465-101). Concerning section 4123.82 of the Ohio Revised Code, the Truscon court further stated: "Nothing
could be clearer than that the legislature, by the provisions of this section, indicated its intention to prevent the reimbursement of the employer for any amount paid pursuant to the
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language would allow the court's statement to encompass any loss to
an employer caused by a third person, whatever the form.
Nevertheless, there have been occasions where an employer has recovered increased premiums paid into the State Insurance Fund from a
negligent third party. In Midvale Coal Co. v. Cardox Corp.,"0 the court
permitted recovery where the negligence of the third party constituted a
breach of an express contract made with the employer of the injured employee." Distinguishing the Truscon case, the court carefully noted that
the language in section 4123.34 of the Ohio Revised Code applied only
to insurance or indemnification contracts.
In the Midvale case, such a
contract was not present. Furthermore, in Midvale the court pointed out
that the defendant was under a duty to avoid injuring the plaintiff's employee, while a similar duty did not exist in the Truscon case. The broad
language of Truscon was limited by holding it applicable only to that
particular fact situation.' 3 Thus, the court acknowledged that an employer can recover only where a contractual duty is involved.
The court in the instant case, Fischer Constr. Co. v. Stroud,"4 recognized that recovery in Midvale was permitted for a breach of contract and
not for a negligent act as in Truscon. Not content with these differing
results, however, the Fischer court overruled Midvale and approved Truscon, stating that "the better rule under the law and statutes is the one
laid down in the Truscon case."' 5 The only other ground for the court's
decision was the "uncertain," "speculative," and "remote" nature of the
damages involved. In the Midvale case, however, the court recognized
that expert testimony by an actuary can "positively" determine damages. 6
This would seem to weaken the reasoning of the Fischer court.
By following Truscon, the court in the Fischer case has tacitly approved its broad language. Thus, the contractual distinction established
in Midvale no longer is effective. The Fischer decision places a blanket
12

provisions of the Workmen's Compensation Act to an injured employee." Truscon Steel Co. v.
Trumbull Cliffs Furnace Co., 120 Ohio St. 394, 397-98, 166 N.E. 368, 369 (1929); cf. L.
Guidice v. Harris, 98 Ohio App. 230, 128 N.E.2d 842 (1954).
10. 152 Ohio St. 437, 89 N.E.2d 673 (1949), aff'd on rehearing, 157 Ohio St. 526, 106
N.E.2d 556 (1952); accord, Bittner v. Boyajohn & Barr, Inc., 19 Ohio L. Abs. 325 (Ct.
App. 1935); cf. Decker Constr. Co. v. Mathis, 122 N.E.2d 38 (Ohio C.P. 1953), where the
court allowed recovery for breach of a duty owed to the employer arising out of an express
contract. The court distinguished the independent negligence situation.
11. Defendant sold blasting equipment to plaintiff. The sales contract provided that the
defendant "maintain such equipment in good serviceable condition .... ... Plaintiff's employee was injured by an explosion caused by defendant's failure to inspect and service the
blasting equipment. Midvale Coal Co. v. Cardox Corp., 152 Ohio St. 437, 438, 89 N.E.2d
673, 674 (1949), aff'd on rehearing, 157 Ohio St. 526, 106 N.E.2d 556 (1952).
12. Id. at 444, 89 N.E.2d at 676-77.
13. See text at note 8 supra.
14. 175 Ohio St. 31, 191 N.E.2d 164 (1963).
15. Id. at 33, 191 N.E.2d at 166.
16. See note 3 supra.
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prohibition on an employer's right of reimbursement from a negligent
third party.
The holding of the Fischer case places the employer under the Ohio
Workmen's Compensation Act at a distinct disadvantage in relation to
employers under acts of other states. Except for West Virginia 7 and
Ohio, all states provide the employer with some vehicle for recovering
both increased premiums and direct payments to employees from third
party tort-feasors.1' In Minnesota, for example, although an employer
was denied recovery of increased premiums paid into the State Insurance
Fund, he could recover through subrogation.'" The court purportedly
based its decision on remoteness of damages, but the underlying policy
consideration was the subrogation provision in Minnesota's Workmen's
Compensation Act.2 ° Under this provision, the employer is subrogated
to the employee's right and remedy against the negligent third party.
Thus, allowing redress in a suit for increased premiums by the employer
in his own right would have resulted in double recovery for the employer in opposition to the rule that subrogation provisions are exclusive."' Such a result could not have occurred in Ohio, however, because
Ohio has no subrogation provision in regard to this problem.
The Midvale case gave the Ohio employer his only opportunity for
the justifiable reimbursement he deserves and for which the act fails to
provide through the normal route of subrogation. The Fischer decision
overruling the Midvale case combined with the effect of section 4123.34
of the Ohio Revised Code and the lack of a subrogation provision deprive
the employer of any possible remedy.2" Indeed, the loss no longer falls
on the party at fault.
EDWARD F. MAREK
17. A federal district court, applying West Virginia substantive law, denied an employer
recovery for increased premiums paid as a result of a third party's negligence. The court
interpreted West Virginia law as precluding an employer from maintaining a suit for subrogation or indemnification. Crab Orchard Improvement Co. v. Chesapeake & 0. Ry., 115 F.2d
277 (4th Cir.), cert. denied, 312 U.S. 702 (1940).
18. "The Acts generally provide [that the] ... employer ... [is] subrogated to the latter's
[employee's) right and remedy against the negligent third person, or they are entitled to be
indemnified by such person, or the Act may give them the right to sue the third party in
their own name...." 3 SCHNEMER, WORKMEN'S COMPENSATiON TExT 178 (3d ed.
1943).
19. Northern State Contracting Co. v. Oakes, 191 Minn. 88, 253 N.W. 371 (1934). A
New Jersey case similarly denied recovery to an employer suing a negligent third party for
reimbursement. The court held that the existence of a subrogation provision precluded the
employer from suing in his own name. United States Cas. Co. v. Hercules Powder Co., 4
N.J. 157, 72 A.2d 190 (1950). Authorities on Workmen's Compensation have approved
both the Minnesota and New Jersey decisions. See, e.g., 2 LARsON, WoRKMEN's COMPENSATON LAw §5 77.20, 77.30 (3d ed. 1961).

20. MINN. REV.STAT. § 176.061 (1945).
21. 2 LARSON, WoKMmN'S COMPENSATION LAW 243-44 (3d ed. 1961).
22. This would seem to include "express idemnification contracts," which are becoming
prevalent in the construction industry.

